Introduction.
The aim of this paper is to show how sociocybernetics, using abstract concepts from cybernetics, can usefully combine biological, psychological and sociological concepts to provide conceptual clarification and insightful understandings of human consciousness. The cybernetic concepts that are central in my account include feedback, circular causality, self-organisation, adaptation, organisational closure, autopoiesis and variety management. I also draw on ideas, models and empirical work that I have discussed in a number of previous papers and weave them together to construct what I hope is a coherent narrative.
The motivation for writing this paper is to add to our understanding of the human condition. As a p , w v ' g ', wh h w d g h m h pp (our home), we are killing and oppressing each other, population growth is out of control, we have pathological belief systems in so-
The paper is structured as follows. There is a brief discussion and critique of how the term ' ' d d d in contemporary neuroscience and cognitive science (philosophy of mind, cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence). As a preface to a cybernetic approach to this topic, there is a brief discussion of reflexive cosmogony and process metaphysics. This is followed by a cybernetic characterisation of awareness and consciousness. With these characterisations, we can then say that conscious systems are objects of study in sociocybernetics. Some sociocybernetic models of conscious systems are then presented and discussed. There is then a discussion of how these sociocybernetics understandings of consciousness can give ethical guidance h w h , d "h h " mm wh h g d w p v . Finally, there are some concluding comments.
Use of the term 'consciousness'
In cognitive science (which includes cognitive neuroscience, artificial intelligence and philosophy of
between the world of experience (mind, subjectivity) and the world of matter (brain and body) and also as interactionist, in that a search is made in the latter for that which gives rise to the former. In contrast, in cybernetics, and its precursors in the American pragmatist philosophy (for example, in William James Principles of Psychology, first published in 1898), it assumed that for all subjective Heinz von Foerster (2003) , Gordon Pask (1975 , 1986 ) and Richard Jung (2007 to "k w g w h" (L.
-scire), where the knowing can be with another or with oneself. This usage distinguishes consciousness as a primarily human phenomenon from the more general
Pask, in several early papers and in his book (1975) book, Conversation, Cognition and Learning, presents a cybernetic account of awareness. Awareness is characterised cybernetically as the dynamics of a self-g g,
Th k v xp ng, and thus enlarging, their environmental niches. They actively adapt to environmental perturbations in an ongoing process of variety (uncertainty) generation by exploration and variety (uncertainty) reduction by anticipation. This process can be found in all living systems. According to Pask, it finds its highest expression in h m , wh xh " d " (P k, 1968, p.1) . Th h h P k' w k on adaptive teaching machines, in which the machines aim to optimise the rate of learning in human learners by presenting problems of increasing difficulty as learning takes place, in such a way as to avoid boredom or overload.
In summary, an observer may distinguish all living systems as showing awareness. She may attribute con h w h wh m w h d 'k w g w h' v interaction.
Reflexive cosmogony and process metaphysics
I begin this section with the above quotations to emphasise that we humans are a mystery that is part of a mystery. We are faced with undecideable questions such as: How did the world begin (cosmogony)? Is there a purpose to it all? What is life? How does the body work? Are there transcendentals? What happened before the big bang? As von Foerster emphasises, as human beings our ultimate freedom resides in how we choose to answer these undecideable questions. Our answers about our world take the form of stories we tell ourselves, cosmogonies. Insofar as these stories address questions about who, what and why we are, they are reflexive cosmogonies. Where should our stories begin? Answering this question takes us into the realm of metaphysics. Here are some examples of metaphysical starting points.
Pleroma (formless stuff) and Creatura ( the world of distinctions) (Carl Jung, 1916 , also cited by Gregory Bateson, 1972 ; Void (full emptiness) and Not-Void (empty fullness) from Hindu philosophy; Indefiniteness and Form (Richard Jung, 2007) ; the void and the form of distinction (George SpencerBrown, 1969) . Essentially, these distinctions are saying the same thing: there is the world of undifferentiated, undescribable all; there is the world of distinction and description constructed by observers.
From classical times, a distinction has been made between cosmogonies that emphasise what the world is made of (its being) as ultimate, unchanging essence or substance and those that emphasise
, theories are oriented towards process, how things behave, and look for explanation not in what those
xp ' m h ' g ' process philosophy of Andrew North Whitehead and applies it phenomenologically to the experience of an observer. For von Demarus, such an occasion of experience has four aspects:
In similar spirit, Richard Jung in his (2009) book, Experience and Action, develops a cybernetic phenomenology in which he distinguishes four explanatory metaphors: two for things that move or
The significance of these schema for cybernetics is that they make clear the richness of phenomena that the study of purposive systems must take into account, whether building purpose (anticipation, goal seeking, goal maintenance, adaptation) into mechanical systems or explaining and modelling purpose in biological, psychological and social systems. Our interest here is in modelling living systems, which cybernetics categorises as self-organising and autopoietic, self-
Cybernetic Modelling and Explanation
A propos of our interest in conscious systems, those with which the observer may converse, it is
Taciturn systems are distinguished and observed by an external observer who infers or builds in their goals. Language oriented systems are self-distinguishing and set their own goals. They are interacted Foerster in his (1974) distinction between a first order cybernetics (the cybernetics of observed systems) and a second order cybernetics (the cybernetics of observing systems, the observation of observation). Thus to attempt to model and understand conscious systems is to study language oriented systems and to engage in second order cybernetics.
With second order cybernetics, the observer is explaining herself to herself in a never-ending hermeneutic narrative and conversational circularity, a spiral of storytelling, agreements, disagreements, understandings and misunderstandings (see figure 1) . Here we see the limits of what can be modelled, what can be explained, as alluded to in our earlier discussion of metaphysics and undecideable questions. As Pask (1969) points out, these limits should not be taken as a reason for despair, rather they show the open-ended and creative nature of our attempts to understand ourselves and the world we live in. We can hope for deeper and better understandings of what it is to be human.
Von Foerster insists that social cybernetics is a second d
: " m a second-order cybernetics -a cybernetics of cybernetics -in order that the observer who enters the von Foerster, 2003, p. 286) In contrast to positivist approaches to the social sciences (e.g., network science, complexity studies and other approaches in the systems sciences), I agree with a majority of the great sociologists (Max W , Em D kh m d T P , x mp ) h d g " h " required in the social sciences. This accords well with our earlier discussion of von Dem ' metvaphysical categories: passage, extension, idea and intention (von Demarus).
In the theorising that follows, I make an analytic distinction between organisationally closed biomechanical systemic unities, which exhibit passage and extension and organisationally closed psychosocial systemic unities which exhibit idea and intention. I have taken this distinction from Pask who in his cybernetic theory of conversations, refers to the former as Mechanical (M) Individuals and the latter as Psychological (P) Individuals. A P Individual (qua psychosocial unity) has the organisational form of a conversation and may be embodied in one or more M Individuals.
Sociocybernetic models of conscious systems
Cybernetic models help us understand how the brain functions as a complex command and control
Figure 2 is an attempt to show the complex dynamic processes that occur as a human learns. The brain/body system is a bio-mechanical unity (M Individual) that actively seeks and processes variety. As it adapts and habituates to the stimuli captured by the sensory systems, it seeks more variety. A number of bodily processes guide and affect the systems. In figure 2, these are labelled: kinaesthesia, w h m h p p p v d v m ; p ( g h d ' internal state), algedonic (pain, pleasure) feedback: endocrine and immune systems. There is also feedback through the environment. Motor responses affect sensory inputs, which inform the learner about where she is and what is happening around her. Familiar settings call forth learned responses. Unfamiliar settings induce learning and adaptation that reduces uncertainty. The figure shows the parts of the system where there is awareness and the learner is conscious with herself of what is happening. As an embodied psychosocial unity (P Individual) the learner may set her own goals and direct her own attention.
Figure 2. The dynamics of learning and awareness
As a graduate researcher, under the supervision of Gordon Pask, I carried out a series of studies of how learners acquire keyboard skills. Learners followed different regimes. In control groups, ' w d nventional drill and practice methods. In experimental groups, others were taught using adaptive teaching machines that presented stimuli indicating which keys to press at wh h w
constructed a computer program model that gave an account how learning takes place. As an aid to exposition, the model had several versions of increasing complexity. The most complex model was d h "F T p " m d . H I g v ief description of how the model works. For more about the Typist models and the experimental studies on which they were based, see Scott and Bansal (2013, 2014) The model simulates the acquisition of the skill of touch typing. It explains why proficient touch typists (1) lose access to a conscious knowledge of the skill structure and (2) are frequently aware that an error has been made, prior to the receipt of feedback.
The learner is modelled as a dynamical self-organising system in which achievement of goals is A disconfirmation in the model simulates the situation where the proficient typist becomes aware of making an error: his/her daydream is interrupted and he/she is called upon to attend consciously to the task at hand. The theoretical justification for the form of the simulation is that the cognition of the typist is seen as a unitary organisation in which particular processes go on concurrently, autonomously and unconsciously so when they do not conflict. When there is conflict there is uncertainty; the learner becomes aware that something requires her attention. The uncertainty is reduced when the learner decides how to resolve the conflict.
Conversation Theory
The Typist model can be generalised for domains other than touch typing as follows.
In the model, operators are created and evolve that bring about finger movements and key pressing. In general, there are cognitive operators or processes that bring about or maintain a relation in a
) Also in the model there are operators (processes) that create and maintain the processes that bring about finger movement and key pressing. In general there are cognitive operators that bring
g he skill has a cyclic form: knowing leads to doing which leads to further knowing and further doing. The process is a whole that reproduces itself in the context of the domain of touch typing. A stable (organisationally closed) system of concepts and memories is what Pask refers to as a PIndividual (Psychological Individual). (See figure 4 .) The terminology is due to Pask as used in conversation theory Kallikourdis 1973, Pask 1975) . Conversation theory had its beginnings in studies of skill-learning; its scope was much enlarged by studies of the learning of academic subject matter Scott 1972, 1973) . Scott (1993) The Typist model explains key aspects of human cognition: how consciously constructed knowledge becomes proceduralised, how conflict in concurrently executed process may engender the conscious awareness of error and uncertainty. The explanations are necessarily second-order: they explain the observer to herself. As constructor of the model and narrator of the theory that gives it significance, I am aware, in conversation with myself, that in writing this article I have been engaged in learning and the acquisition and performance of skills. Suitably generalised, the theory provides an account of
serve as constraints to which evolving concepts must fit. The construction of a satisfactory new concept may happen within a few milliseconds or may require deep thought and gestation over a period of days, weeks or a life time.
. Conceptualisation is conserved (one cannot not conceptualise). This is the ongoing process of thinking, imagining and problem solving. Concepts may be refined as new distinctions are made (for example, dogs are distinguished as different breeds. Concepts may be generalised as distinctions are voided (for example, dogs are seen as members of the class, animals). Concepts are applied in particular contexts of action and interaction (as examples: cycling, doing algebra, playing chess).
g wh h m p similarities and differences (for example, chess has similarities with draughts and other games). We conceptualise selves and others (see figure 5 ). 
h h answer questions, explain matters and demonstrate procedures. They teach their understandings back to each other. They agree and may agree to disagree. In so doing the conversation itself takes the form of a P-Individual, a psychosocial unity. 
Creating and maintaining healthy communities
' preferred term) in these processes. I have dealt with these topics at some length in other papers (Scott, 2007a (Scott, , 2011c 
